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SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT AVAILABILITY:
THE IMPACT OF BANK SIZE
Thoma~ A . Ulrich
and
Stephe n A. Mathh

While there has been considerable research regarding the impact of increased bank size on the services provided by the banking community, the
impact of increased bank size on small business credit availability remains
unresolved. Whether increased bank size results in greater, less, or no
change in small business credit availability is far from being just a moot
issue. Due to their size, small businesses do not have access 10 the capital
markets a nd hence, must rely to a much greater extent on the banking community for both short-and long-term credit compared to their larger
counterparts. Currently, small business accounts for more than 50 percent
of all private employment and 43 percent of the nation's gross national product. However. aggregate size alone does not account for the importance of
small business. Small business ha, also been a principal source of innovation which has provided for technological improvements in our economy.
Nowhere are its benefits to society more clearly evident than in its ability 10
create new jobs. Over the past few years, small business ha~ provided nearly
90 percent of all nev. jobs in the private sector. Thus, increased or decreased
credit availability 10 ,mall business by the banking community can ha\'e
substantial impact on society's economic well being.
The purrose of this article is to present the result~ of :i study comparing
commercial bank loan officers from banb of different size in evaluating
small busine<,s loan applications. Do commercial loan officers at larger
banb weigh the factors underlying the decision to grant credit and the
terms of credit to small busmess differently than smaller banks? If so, what
are the implications of increased bank size on ,mall business credit
availability? The fiN section of this paper re\'iews the previous re,earch
regarding the impact of increased bank size on ,mall business credit. In the
second section the methodology and data u,ed in thi, study are described.
In the third section a statistical analysis of the results arc presented. finally,
in the laq section conclusions and implications arc discus,ed.

Using data obtained from the 1946 and I 957 Bu\ine\s Loan Surveys of
the Federal Re~erve System, several studie~ (see U.S. Congress [ 1952, 1958,
1960], G uttentag a nd Herman [ I 966) and Jacobs [ I 965)) investigated the
impact increased bank size would have on small business. Jacobs summarizes much of the early research when he conclude~:
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Size of bank has an important impact on rhe distribution
of_ loans am~ng large and small business and the prices
paid for credit by these businesse~. Surveys which sr udied
bank_ loan portfolio\ indicate that large banks make a large
fraction of their loans to large bu\iness and a 5ma11 fraction to ~mall. busine~s. The opposite is true of small banks .
. . This implies that if \mall banks were merged, with demand conditions unchanged, loans to large business would
increase and !hose to small business decline; or, that prices
charged \mall busine~se\ for loans \~ould rise [1965, pp.
344-45].
However, a different view of the survey data was taken by Guttentag
and Herman (1966]. They felt that the problem was not as simple as that
5uggested by Jacobs and the Congressional studies. Basically, they felt that
the increased loan to deposit ratio of larger banks could offset the
preference for loans to larger busines5es over smaller firms. Therefore, any
merger of \mailer hanks to form larger banks does not necessarily imply
that the dollar volume of loans to \mall bu5iness v.,ill be reduced or that the
relative price of such loans v.ill be increased. Rather, they argue that the increase or decrease of loan \ olume to \mall business due to increased bank
size depends on the relative strength of the5e two conflicting tendencies. In
e,·aluating the relative strength of these tendencies their research suggests
that while further growth among the largest banks would ha,e a negative effect on ~mall business, consolidation among the smallest banks would in..:rca\c loam to \mall business borrowers substantially.
Do banks discriminate against small business in favor of larger firms in
the granting of ..:redii and the term5 of credit? Thi~ question has been investigated by a number of authors (see Bach and Huizenga (1961], Benston
[1964], Levenson [1962], and Silber and Polakoff (1970)). Levenson [19621
rnnduded that allowing for risk, the interest rate differentials are justified
by cost differences. Bemton (1964] came 10 a ;imilar conclusion . He Found
that differences in the rate of interest charged by commercial banks on large
and ;mall loan; can be explained largely by differences in the cost of lending
and the cost of risk. However, this conclu~ion is not unanimous. In fact,
two studie~ using the ~ame data arrived at contradictory conclusions.
Using data from the 1955 and 1957 Federal Reserve Bu~iness Loan Surveys, Bad1 and Huizenga [1961] felt that the data did not 5upport the widely
held criticism that tight money discriminated unfairly among small borrowers in terms of both credit availability and credit cost. They argued that
once traditional banking ;tandards of creditworthiness were accounted for
the differences ob;erved in the loans to various borrower groups renected
primarily difference; in loan demand rather than dbcrimination by bankers
on other grounds.
But, Silber and Polakoff [ 1970] using the same data arrived at the opposite conclusion. They found that banks wishing to favor large business
raised the portion of funds available for large business loans while, at th e
same time, desiring to discriminate against small business reduced the por44

tion of funds available for small business loans. The authors concluded the
desire to discriminate against small bu~iness existed and was effective.
Thus, the issue of whether increased bank size will have a restrictive effect
on the credit banks grant to \mall businesses remains unresolved. Therefore, this study takes a somewhat different approach than the previous research by focusing on the analysis stage of the loan decision making process.
Methodolog) and Data

The methodolog} employed in this paper differs from previous
research on two important points. First, this research focuses on the analysis stage of the loan decision making process. Second, it deals only with
small business loans. All of the previous studies relied on data for outstanding loans. As a result, no consideration could be given to loan applications
that ,~ere turned down, an important consideration in establishing the
presence of discrimination. Since preference or discrimination against small
business is essentially a lender characteristic, factor~ important to the len<ler
should be of primary interest. Consequently, thi~ re~earch employs a
behavioral model of the evaluation of ~mall business loan proposals. The
model consists of four factors underlying a bank's decision to extend credit
to small business and the tenm of that credit. By employing this model consideration can implicitly be given to all loan proposals rather than only to
those that have been accepted.
Since this study deals only with small business loans, no direct conclusions concerning the preference by bank, for large loan~ over ~mall loans
can be drawn. However, by con~1dering the differences among banks of different size in their evaluation of small business loan proposals it may be
possible to draw implications concerning this mauer indirectly. Moreover,
this emphasis on ~mall business loans allows us to focus or. which small
business firms will be most affected by increased bank size.

A Sune) of Banks
A questionnaire was sent to commercial loan officers of 249 banb
listed in Moody's Bank and Finance Manual. Of the 249 banks surveyed,
I28 responded-a response rate of 51.4 percent. The distribution by size of
deposits of the banh included in the survey together with the response rate
for each group is shown in Table I.

The commercial loan officers were asked to rate a series of items as to
their relative importance in the loan officer's decison regarding the extension of credit and the terms of credit to small business. The ratings ranged
45

TABLE I
Sile Distribution of Banks in Sun·ey
Size of
Deposits
(l\tillion,)

Number
Bank, in
Survey

Percentage
of Survey

Number of
8dnks
Responding

Percentage of
Total Banks
Responding

Les, than S50

159

63.9ro

68

53. I "o

S5ll - S~~CJ

(,4

25. 71710

-l2

32.8"',

S~50 or more

26

10.41710

18

14.1 '7,

Total

~49

100.0

118

100.oa-.

..,

from "I" mdicatmg no importance to "5" indicating maximum importance. For the purpose of this study, a small business firm was defined in
term~ of annual sales volume a\ follows:
Annual ~ale~ Volume
Construction
Retail & Services
~lanu facturing
Wholesale

Less
Less
Less
Less

than
than
than
than

$5 million
55 million
SIO million
$10 million

The items rated by the commercial loan officers are based on a
behavioral model representing the analysis of small busine% loan applications [Ulrich and Arlow. 1981). This sma ll bu~iness loan evaluation model
identifies four dimensiom underlying the commercial loan officer's decision
regarding the extcntion of credit a nd terms of credit to small business. With
the model it is possible to measure the relative importance individual comm ercial loan officers assign to each of these four dimensions. Three of the
dimensiom are risk related-fina ncial soundness, loan size, and loan
maturity-and the fourth is related to the cost of the loan. Each dimension
has a set of items that can be used to measure its relative importance in the
cred it granting d ecision. These scale items are presented in Table 2. Data
concerning the reliabilit y of these scales is presented in Ulrich and Arlov.
[1981) .
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TABLE 2
Behavioral Loan Evaluation Model

Scale Items

Dimension

Financial Soundness

I.
2.
3.
4.

Firm's liquidity position
Firm'~ debt to equity ratio
Firm', rate of return on a%ets
Availability of certified financial statement,

Loan Cost

I.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Cost of implementing loan
Cost of monitoring loan
Availability of cash budget
Availability of interim financial statements
Government guaranty of loan

Loan Size

I. Ri sk of default
2. Sile of loan relative to size of business
3. Information on previous loans

Loan Maturity

I. Type of repayment plan
2. Intender.I purpo~e of loan
3. Maturity of loan requested

To pro, ide insight into the impact increa~ed bank size would have on
small business credit a,ailability the relative importance assigner.I to each of
the dimensions of the small busines~ loan evalution model by the commercial lending officers wa, compared a1.:ro,, banks of different size. This wa,
done by means of an analysis of variance model. The varying bank size is
described in Table I.

Research f inding~

The individual response, of the commercial loan officers were grouped
on bank si1e and averaged. These mean re~ponscs are presented in Table 3
for each scale item. In addition, the overall mean is presented for each scale
to indicate the relative importance of each of the four dimen~ions.
The ranking of the four dimensions baser.I on their overall means is
consistent across banks of different size. Eac h group of banks ranked loan
size first in importance, followed by loan maturity, financial soundness,
and loan cost, respectively. These rankings clearly indicate that banks
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T.\BLE3
Commercial Lending OHicer~· Mean Responses by Bank Size

Dimenson

Large Medium Small

A. Financial Soundnes,
1. Firm's liquidity position
2. Firm's debt to equity ratio
3. Firm', rate of return on as~ets
4. Availability of certified financial
statements
Overall mean

4.06
4.22
3.22

4.16
4.24
3.36

3.91
4.04
3.47

3.67
3.79

3.83

3.74

2.56
3.17
2. 78

1.90
2.62
2. 77

2.29
2.52

3.44

3.31

3.40

B. Loan Cost
I.
2.
3.
4.

Cost of implementing loan
Cost of monitoring loan
Availability of cash budget
A rnilability of interim financial
~tatemcnt<,
5. Government guaranty of loan
Overall mean
C. Loan Size
I. Ri,k of default
2. Size of loan relative to sile of business
3. Information of previous loan,
0\ erall mean
D. Loan Maturity
I. Type of repayment plan
2. Intended purpose of loan
3. Maturity of loan requested
Overall mean
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2. 96

1.87

_lR_ _ll2_
2.62

2.49

4.56
4.28

4.57
4.29

4.49
4.22

4.20

4.21

4.19

4.05

4.17
4.26

3.80

--1.A.._~_lJL

4. I I

4.00

~~_lfil_
3.82

4.06

3.94

regardless of size consider 1he risk dimensions to be more important than
the cost dimension. The lower relative importance for the cost dimension is
most likely due to the fact that cost is more explicit than risk and therefore
is easier to measure. As a result, cost differences can be more easily handled
through fee requirement s or by increasing the interest rate on the loan to
cover any extra cost.
There is also consistency in the ranking of the scale items acro~s banks
for the risk dimensions. However, this wa~ not the case for the cost dimension. While the banks agreed on the ranking of availability of financial
statements firn and cost of implementing loan last, they differed in the
relative ranking of the other scale items.
To determine whether the relative importance of the dimensiom
underlying the loan decision analysis differed among banks of different
size, four separate analysis of variance tests were employed. The dependent
variable in each instance wa, the overall mean response value of the individual commercial loan officers for the dimension of interest. This overall
mean response value was computed by taking the individual loan officer's
original response for each scale item a nd averaging them. The resulting
mean indicated the loan officer's assigned relative importance to the dimension.
The loan officers' overall mean responses by bank size and the computed F-ratio from the analysis of variance tests are presented in Table 4.
The result~ show that no statistically significant difference was found
among bank, of different size for the dimen~ions of financial soundness,
loan size, and loan maturity. However. a significant diffcn:nce at the 0.05
level \\a, found among banb for the loan cost dimension. Following the
analysis of variance test. Scheffc's post hoc analysis was carried out to
locate the cau,e of the significant difference. The Scheffe te,t does this by
comparing all the pair-wise difference, bet\\een the group levcb at the
significance level of 0.05 (See Kirk (1968, p. 90]). In this case the cau,e of
the significant difference among banks of different size wa, due to the difference betv,een ~mall and large banks with respect to loan cost. Large
ban~, assign significantly more relative importance to the cost dimension
than do ~mall banks.
fABI I-, -1
Anal}~i.s of \ aria nee l e~h

Group Meam and t--S1a1i~tics

Financial Soundness
Loan Cost
Loan Sile
Loan Maturit y
•p

Small

!I.tedium

Large

F-Ratio

3.74
2.49
4.20
3.82

3.83
2.62
4 .21
4.06

3.79
2.96
4.19
3.94

0.24
3.11 •
0.01
1.99

< 0.05, statistically significant.
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Su mmar~ and Conclusion\

-

In order that the entire spectrum of small business lo
turned down as well as those approved could be
_dan rdequests-those
f
·
cons1 ere this
h
ocused on the analysis stage of the loan decision mak·
'
r~earc
do b
·
b h ·
mg process. This was
ne y usmg a e av1oral model of the evaluation of ' m II b .
· •
• a usmess loan
Proposa ls. The resu II~ indicate
that bank\ assign greater relat· ·
I
h ·k f h
ive importance
o t e rn . o t. e loan than to its· cost
· of the
· · The three r·isk d'1mens1ons
~odel-:-fmanc~al ~oundness, loan size, and loan maturity-were ranked
higher m relame 1m~ortance than was the cost dimension. In addition
banks regardless of size \\ere in agreement on the Je\·eJ of relat· ·
'
1ve impor. I
tance t iey assigned to each of these three ri~k dimensions Thi's
•
. . .
·
wasnmtrue
f
or the co~t d1mens1on. A s1gmf1cant difference wa~ found between large
and small banks \\Ith large banks ranking loan cost relatively more im orrant than \mall banks.
P
T~is difference is not surprising hen one considers the dissimilarities
that exist between _large and ,mall banks. Large banks have more sophisticated cost accounting systems which t'nable them to assign costs to specific
loans. As a result one \\ ould expect the loan officers at large ban ks to be
more concerned with the importance of the cost dimension of granting
loans than their counterparts at small banks. In addition to differences in
the ability to mea~ure costs, differences in the behavior of the underlying
cost funcuons could account for the ranking difference. For small banks the
cost of a loan officer is considered more or less fixed. In as much as the
bank need~ a loan officer and to the extent that his services are not completely utilized, additional loam do not inaease this component of the
bank\ cost. This is not the case for large banks. As they employ a large
number of loan officers and have a greater number of loans the cos1
beha, 1or function for loan officer cost is perceived to be more variable than
fixed. Accordingly, large banks would be expected to pay closer attention to
1he cost of implementmg and monitoring loans. Finally small banks have
the advantage that they usually are part of a ~mailer community.
Therefore, their loan officers are in a position 10 more easily assess the character of their loan cu\tomer and to monitor their customers' businesses. As
a result these costs arc less important for the small bank. To be sure the
strength of each of these elements will vary from bank to bank but their aggregate impact can account for the difference found between large and
\mall banks in ranking the relallve importance of loan cost dimension.
Unfortunately our research does not resolve the issue concerning the
impact of increa~ed bank size on small business credi1 availabili1y. Nevertheless, our findings are useful. By employing a behavioral approach we
were able to discover that it is on the cost dimension that large and small
ban ks differ. Thus, should large banks desire to discriminate against small
business, the ~mall busine~s firms that would be most affected w~ul~ be
those which engender high costs of loan evaluation and loan momtor!ng.
Given the recent sentiments favoring interstate branch banking, liberahzed
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state bra nch banking laws would appear to be just a matter of time. Hence,
this is more than just a moot issue.
In o rder to accomodate this potential increase in bank size, those small
business executives who wish to avoid any adverse effects ~hould initiate effort s to lower information costs for lending institutions. This might be accomplished by instituting financial information systems which would
facilita te the preparation of cash budgets and interim financial statements
on a regular basis. An added benefit of this approach is better financial and
plann ing information for the small business executive. Consequently, if
small businesses hope to maintain access to sufficient credit in the changing
commercial banking environment thry will have to incorporate this type of
thinking into their long range planning.
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